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Introduction
In its heyday, Europe's common agricultural policy (CAP) led to huge stockpiles of agricultural products.
Colorful terms like "butter mountains" and "wine lakes" were common. This policy appears wasteful.
However, it may actually be optimal, given the policymakers'preferences and the constraints that they face.
The idea is quite simple. Suppose agricultural producers receive much weight in the government's social welfare function. This could be due to political reasons or any other social objectives. In this setting, the government has an incentive to use its policy instruments to redistribute income in favor of this group. But there may be obstacles that deter direct redistribution. For instance, it is generally accepted that lump sum redistribution is not feasible. Also, the income tax is not suited for sector speci…c redistribution. So other policy tools must be used, and price supports are a candidate. The government can use taxes and subsidies to raise the relative price of agricultural products at the producer level. Presumably the government could also use its policy instruments to manipulate consumer prices in such a way that these markets just clear.
But in a general equilibrium setting, any price distortion in one market can have feedback e¤ects in other markets. Hence, there is no a priori reason to believe that the optimal policy is one in which all markets just clear. It may be optimal to allow the private sector to produce more than it consumes, with the government stepping in to purchase the surplus and simply store it in stockpiles. Ideally, one would like to see these stockpiles put to good use. However, it may be impossible to achieve this through the price system because of adverse general equilibrium e¤ects. Of course, there may be other policies that can e¤ectively put the stockpiles to use (e.g., price discrimination through food vouchers for the poor, or dumping the surplus on international markets), but that is beyond the focus of this paper. Here, the goal is simply to demonstrate a set of circumstances under which stockpiles could be optimal. Section 2 presents a simple general equilibrium example that illustrates the possibility described above.
The key feature is the following. The good in excess supply (agricultural output) is a consumption complement, at the aggregate level, of other goods for which the market just clears. Under this assumption, consider what happens if the consumer price of the agricultural product is lowered in an e¤ort to stimulate demand, thus reducing the size of the stockpile: The demand for the complements also increases. This causes demand to exceed supply for the complements, which cannot be an equilibrium. It may be possible to restore equilibrium by adjusting other prices. But if the interactions between markets are su¢ ciently complex, then all of these new equilibria may have lower social welfare than the original equilibrium. Under this scenario, the stockpile is optimal.
3
There are four commodities: two types of specialized labor/leisure and two …nal goods. Type`labor is used to produce good x. This is the agricultural sector. Type n labor is used to produce good y. This is the manufacturing sector. Intermediate goods are not included in order to keep the analysis simple. Thus goods x and y are consumed directly by households.
Production is organized as follows. Agricultural production is carried out by a single self-employed farmer.
Manufacturing, on the other hand, is carried out by one private sector …rm that has constant returns to its only input, factory labor. Thus there are no pro…ts to be distributed to households. Labor is completely specialized. That is, the farmer cannot provide labor for manufacturing, and factory workers cannot work the land. This could be justi…ed through a comparative advantage argument. The assumption that all agricultural output is generated by household production is clearly unrealistic. However, a model with both corporate farms and household farms would add little to the story.
There are only two consumers. One is the farmer. The other is a factory worker.
Consumer 1 (self-employed farmer) has the following utility function:
which is written here as a function of consumption levels (not net demands). The assumption that x and y are perfect complements is analytically convenient. The endowment is L 1 units of labor/leisure. The technology for producing agricultural output is as follows. One unit of labor yields one unit of good x. Let q x and q y denote consumer prices, and let p x be the producer price for food. (Then q x p x = tax, or subsidy if negative.) The budget constraint is
This forces the farmer to sell all output through the market. This turns out to be an innocuous restriction since production of x will be subsidized (p x > q x ). Thus, the farmer would rather sell all output then buy x 1 of it back, rather than bypass the market and eat x 1 directly. The utility maximizing consumption levels
and the aggregate supply of food is
Consumer 2 (factory worker) has the following utility function:
U 2 (n 2 ; x 2 ; y 2 ) = 2 log(minfn 2 ; x 2 g) + log y 2 :
The endowment is N 2 units of labor/leisure. The budget constraint is
The utility maximizing consumption levels are
and the aggregate supply of factory labor is N 2 n 2 . Indirect utility is V 2 = 2 log[q n =(q n +q x )]+log(q n =q y )+ constant.
The manufacturing …rm can transform factory labor one-for-one into good y. Thus the production constraint is Y N 2 n 2 . The direct social welfare function is W = U 1 + U 2 .
The government solves an optimal taxation problem (e.g., Auerbach, 1985; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; and Mirrlees, 1986) . Indirect social welfare is maximized subject to the weak inequalities for market clearing.
By Walras'Law, the government's budget constraint is satis…ed with equality. That is, the cost of buying the surplus equals the net revenue from taxation:
This holds because both consumers satisfy their budget constraints with equality, the market for good y just clears, and the manufacturing …rm earns zero pro…ts.
If the level of agricultural production leads to excess supply, the market clearing condition for good x will not bind. Then the government's problem is to choose p x , q x , q y , and q n to maximize V 1 + V 2 subject to y 1 + y 2 Y N 2 n 2 where the consumption quantities are given by the solutions to the consumers' problems. Given the structure of the example -in particular, the perfect complements and the constant solution for`1 -the government's problem can be written maximize U 1 + U 2 = log y 1 + 2 log n 2 + log y 2 + constant subject to y 1 + y 2 + n 2 N 2 where the choice variables are now the quantities y 1 , y 2 , and n 2 . The prices that support the optimal allocation can then be inferred by inverting the consumers'demand functions. 1 The solution is
(Recall that the perfect complements satisfy y 1 = x 1 and n 2 = x 2 .) And from the farmer's problem,
With the normalization q x = 1, the optimal prices are
Finally, we must con…rm that this optimum indeed has excess supply in the market for good x, i.e.,
Also, agricultural production must be subsidized: p x > q x . After substitution, these 1 This is just a change of variables. Rather than optimizing over the four nominal variables px, qx, qy, and qn, one can optimize over the three real variables y 1 = (1 + 1 ) 1 L 1 px=(qx + qy), y 2 = (1 + 2 ) 1 N 2 qn=qy, and n 2 = 2 (1 + 2 ) 1 N 2 qn=(qn + qx). 5 inequalities lead to the following parameter restrictions:
It follows that there is an open set of parameter values for which agricultural stockpiles are optimal. In particular, if the consumers'parameters satisfy
then stockpiles are optimal for all su¢ ciently large values of , i.e., for all su¢ ciently large welfare weights on the farmer.
Discussion
The example is designed to be simple, but there is nothing pathological about it. For instance, it does not violate the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production e¢ ciency theorem. Production here is e¢ cient; distribution is not so e¢ cient. As a general matter, the optimal tax problem will select the most desirable allocation from among those that are both productively feasible and market feasible (i.e., attainable through the price system). The Diamond-Mirrlees theorem tells us that the optimum must lie on the frontier of the production possibilities set. There are no further restrictions that tell us where on the frontier we will end up. Nor is there any requirement that the production point must coincide with the consumption point. In the example, the gap between the production and consumption of good x allows us to achieve a higher level of social welfare. If we were to require this market to just clear, welfare would necessarily be lower (for the range of parameter values indicated above).
One might object that the example's optimal tax problem has a producer price, p x , among the choice variables. Perhaps this drives the result? Standard optimal tax problems contain only consumer prices.
However, such an objection is not warranted. We can easily convert the example into the standard form and get exactly the same result, optimal excess supply. The interpretation would be di¤erent but the analysis would remain as above. Suppose the self-employed farmer is split into two separate economic entities: a farm worker (consumer) and a farm (…rm). The farm worker now earns labor income at the wage rate q`, while the farm uses the one-for-one technology to transform farm labor into agricultural output. So q`replaces p x in consumer 1's problem, but all else remains the same. The drawback is that the example no longer tells a story about agricultural price supports.
Consider the general form of an optimal tax problem. This may help shed some light on the example.
The government's choice variable is a vector of prices q, and perhaps also a head tax/subsidy T . The objective is to maximize an indirect social welfare function W (q; T ) subject to a number of market clearing conditions. If those conditions can be written as F 1 (q; T ) 0, . . . , F n (q; T ) 0 with n > 1, then the 6 Diamond-Mirrlees theorem tells us that at least one of these inequalities must bind; it does not tell us that all of them must bind. And indeed, this is what happens in the example. More generally, whenever there are specialized factors of production, it may be possible to express the market clearing conditions in this way with n > 1. This opens up the possibility for optimal excess supply. Whether the possibility becomes a reality depends on both private preferences (demand functions) and social preferences. The example's demand complementarities and social welfare weights provide a combination that yields optimal stockpiles.
Other combinations are surely possible. 2 A general set of conditions awaits future research.
